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COUNTERMEASURE POLICY ON THE SAMHO
BROTHER BENZENE SHIP ACCIDENT
Chin-Long Lin* and Jian-Hwa Hu*
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ABSTRACT
th

On October 10 , 2005, the chemical ship SAMHO BROTHER
mishap occurred in the Taiwan Strait while transporting a
cargo of benzene. Explosive approach was applied but failed,
causing the ship wreck sank to a depth of 70 m. Oil spill was
recovered in a small amount, leaving about 50 tons of the fuel
remained. On the other hand, environmental monitoring at the
site of the accident revealed that almost all of the great amount
of 3140 m3 benzene remains stored in the nine tanks on the
ship and further actions upon such a unique event in the history are urgent. Some possible ways for countermeasure policy
are analyzed and discussed subjectively and objectively based
on considerations of the ship owner and the government of the
Republic of China at Taiwan. They are to leave the ship at its
current site, to salvage the ship and its cargo, to extract the
remaining fuel oil and benzene, and to blow up the ship in an
underwater explosion.

I. INTRODUCTION
Ship mishaps occur from time to time throughout the history of mankind. In fact, ships sunken at sea during wars are
even numerous. In ancient times, aside from the immediate
loss of life and property, possible ensuing problems from the
accident are limited. However, technological advances have
not only increased marine transportation capacity, but have
also led to an increasingly diverse range of goods being carried
internationally. These commodities include substances leading various controversies. In recent years, there had been some
major ship wrecks in which cargo including radioactive nuclear fuels as well as other chemical and metal substances
spilled into the sea or sank to the sea bed. For example, the
Russian submarine Kursk, sank to the bottom of the Barents
Sea following an explosion on August 12th of 2000 [2, 3, 11,
13] and attracted worldwide attention.
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Fuel spills are a common result when large fuel oil powered
vessels encounter misfortune at sea. Such events can often
result in extensive and long-term negative impacts on the
coastal environment. On January 14th, 2001, the Greek cargo
ship Amorgos struck a reef in southern Taiwan, causing a 1100
ton fuel spill that polluted 20 hectares of sea and severely
damaged local marine ecosystem and fishery resources [6].
Since background information on marine life and resources
was unavailable, there was insufficient evidence to confirm
the damage, and hence claims for damages were significantly
reduced. Undoubtedly, mishaps involving oil tankers have the
potential for catastrophic environmental consequences. On
March 24th, 1989, America’s Exxon Valdez encountered a
calamity in the Alaskan Sea [9, 16, 17], and on September 13th,
2002, the Spanish Prestige suffered a huge amount of fuel
leakage [1, 4]. Moreover, on February 7th, 1977, the Kuwaiti
vessel Borag, which was carrying 32000 tons of crude oil,
struck a reef and sank north of Taiwan, spilled at least 15000
tons of oil to pollute the entire northern coast of Taiwan.
According to the background information regarding the regional ecosystem provided by the two nuclear power plants in
northern Taiwan as part of a long term survey [5], the losses
suffered by the fishing industry were estimated at 17.27 million USD for offshore fisheries, 2.6 million for coastal fisheries, 10 million USD for harvesting fisheries, and 2.61 million for the aquaculture, totaling 32.48 million USD [15] was
justified to be paid off by the ship owner according to the
international law.
Along with the development of the petrochemical industry
and the growing demand for petroleum products, the weight of
chemical cargo has increased substantially over the past decade. It is worth investigating whether marine exploration technologies are adequate for dealing with the aftermath of marine
accidents when vessels carry chemicals. In July, 2005, M/T
Kyokuyo-Maru, which was laden with benzene, collided with
another ship, the M/V Nikko Maru, near Japan, resulting in a
fire, explosion, and two deaths among the respective crews
with four crew members going missing [12]. After failing to
control the fire, the Japanese Coast Guard and the Marine
Disaster Prevention Center let the fire continue to burn up the
remaining oil and benzene, before towing the ship 59 nm
(nautical miles) from the coast and allowing it to sink 4,400 m
to the bottom of the sea. The entire process took 8 days. This
was the first recorded case of ship carrying benzene being
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wrecked by the approach to burn out the benzene on the surface of the sea, and then deal with the hull.
In October, 2005, a similar marine accident, involving the
SAMHO BROTHER, a chemical cargo carrier loaded with
benzene, occurred in the Taiwan Strait. The ROC government
and experts from all over the world conferred intensely on the
best strategy for minimizing environmental damage. Imitating
the response adopted by the Japanese to a similar incident,
the initial plan was to recover the oil spill at sea, and then
blow up the ship wreck using explosives. Unexpectedly however, firing missiles from the air failed to achieve the desired
result. The ship itself along with the large amount of benzene
sank to the bottom of the sea. The problem has not been resolved, and remains there to this day. Further actions are
deemed necessary to remove the sunken ship. This study
retraces the event of the mishap and reviews the events involved in this disaster and the measures taken in response.
Additionally, this study discusses the observation and evaluation of fuel oil spill as well as the methods and results for the
detection of benzene leakage. In addition, feasible strategies
for dealing with sunken ships lying on the ocean floor and
carrying chemical substances are investigated and analyzed to
attain the most practicable approach for removal of the dangerous material. A short note regarding this study has been
published by Lin and Hu [10].

Table 1. SAMHO BRATHOR ship information.
Ship’s Name (English)
Port of Registry
Flag

Tonnnages

Freeboard Summer (mm)
Draft (m)
Speed (Kt)
Propulsion System of Ship
Overall Length (m)
Place of Build
Date of Build

SAMHO BROTHER
JEJU
KOREA
Gross
2,418.00
Gross on ITC
2,761.00
Net on ITC
1,172.00
Deadweight
3,561.00
1810
5.713
13
Single screw diesel engine
91.5
TONGYEONG
29-10-2003

The lacation of SAMHO BROTHER

Taiwan Strait
Tao Yuan

II. EMERGENCY ACTIONS
SAMHO BROTHER, a Korean chemical cargo ship weighing
2500 tons (see Table 1 for details) was steered from Yuso,
Korean to Kaoshiung, Taiwan. At 00:30 on October 10th in
2005, at 25°01'N, 120°50'E, 9 nm from the coast of Taoyuan
(Fig. 1), it collided with T. S. Hong Kong, a Nigerian cargo
ship en route from Keelung to Hong Kong, on the port side
near its stern.
After the collision, oil began to leak from the engine room
of SAMHO BROTHER, and at 02:45, the captain gave the
order to abandon ship. Fourteen crew members were rescued
successfully by five surface cutters and two helicopters of the
ROC-Coast Guard. Soon afterwards the ship capsized. Due to
the high seas in winter, the Coast Guard sent cutters to safeguard the alarmed region two days later and found the ship
with only its bow above water at 09:21 on the 12th (Fig. 2(a)) at
120°48' E, 24°58' N, 2 nm from the collision site. The water
depth there was 70-72 m while the ship had a length of 91 m,
meaning the ship would have been standing upright with its
stern on the floor (Fig. 2(b)).
The ROC government established the Hazard Response
Center (HRC) immediately after then. Because the vessel was
carrying approximately 3140 m3 of benzene and according to
the log book the total amount of oil of various kinds was 81
tons, the HRC announced access restrictions on the area within
a 5 km radius of the sunken ship. Vessels were sent to safe
areas near the site each day to gather air and sea water samples
for testing. Additionally, responsibility was placed on the ship

SAMHO BROTHER
mishap
Hsin Chu
Nanliao
Wypu

Taiwan

Tongshiao

Fig. 1. The location of SAMHO BROTHER mishap in Taiwan Strait. The
red star represents the weather buoy of Central Weather Bureau.

owner to rapidly manage the sunken ship and to control the
spread of the oil spill.
The HRC demanded that the ship owner should immediately act to remove the cargo from the stricken vessel. To achieve
this, the ship owner proposed either immediately blowing the
vessel up to burn off the benzene, or waiting for sea conditions
to improve and then removing the benzene by some other
method. The HRC, formed by related experts called upon by
the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), agreed
with that blowing the vessel up to burn the cargo was a feasible
proposal based on prudent consideration of the available options, and of the desirability of acting swiftly. Benzene has a
low burning temperature, and only 0.07% dissolves in water,
and thus it was assumed that it was rapidly burned off following the explosion. Even when benzene evaporates into air,
it rapidly dissipates in sunlight and heat.
At 06:45 on October 27th, two air force F16 fighter planes
carrying four missiles made two attempts to explode the vessel,
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Sea Surfase

Benzene
Heavy fuel IFO-180
Diesel

Seabed

(a)

(b)

Fig. 2. (a) SAMHO BROTHER sunk with its bow surging above the water two days after collision; (12/10/2005 CGA), (b) The estimated situation of the
ship wreck according to the water depth and vessel length.

Fig. 3. The results of SAMHO BROTHER wreck after shot by missiles. (27/10/2005, CGA)

but failed to hit the target. Meanwhile twelve cutters and boats
and ten oil recovery boats were standing by within a 10 nm
radius to deal with any possible emergencies. At 16:10, two
more ship explosion attempts were made by the army helicopters. Unexpectedly however, the SAMHO BROTHER
suffered minor damage to the emerged hull in the bow (Fig. 3),
and neither exploded nor sank. Until October 30th, it was
finally found disappeared but with 200 m long and 10 m wide
grey oil slick on the sea surface. On November 2nd, the wind
weakened, and the HRC authorized National Taiwan Ocean
University to dispatched its research vessel, Ocean Researcher
2 (R/V OR2), together with a naval mine hunter to conduct
underwater detection of the sunken vessel. The SAMHO

BROTHER was found lying horizontally on the seabed, with
its bow pointing towards the southwest and resting on its starboard side (Fig. 4). The nine benzene storage troughs appeared free of distortion or cracks.
Derivative problems arise. An important question was the
arrangement of the nine benzene storage tanks on the SAMHO
BROTHER whether the benzene should be cleaned up or
could safely be left to be disposed of naturally. Additionally,
although the ship owner had successfully commissioned specialized agencies to remove the 80 tons of fuel oil that leaked
from the vessel using traditional recovery tools such as absorbents and oil booms, how to detect and deal with oil possibly remaining on the ship requires further investigation.
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Fig. 4. The image of SAMHO BROTHER sunk at the depth of 70 m. The
side scan taken by R/V Ocean Researcher 2 of National Taiwan
Ocean University. (25/10/2005, R/V OR2)

III. FOLLOW-UP OBSERVATIONS
From Oct 11th to November 30th, 2005, eight ORBs (oil
recovery boats) were sent to the disaster site to recover spilled
oil. During the same period, the HRC dispatched two daily
helicopter patrols, at 9 am and 3 pm, together with several
cutters and research vessels, to alert, film, observe, and draw
testing samples for documentation and analysis. The contents
of reports included the records for the spreading and recovering of spilled oil, the air and water qualities, …, etc.
1. Oil Dissipation
According to statements given by the captain and chief
engineer of the SAMHO BROTHER, as well as the investigative report compiled by the Taichung Harbor Bureau, at the
time of abandonment the vessel was carrying 59.4 tons of
heavy fuel oil, 16.7 tons of diesel, and 4.9 tons of lubricating
oil, for a total of 81 tons of oil. Although all the fuel tanks
were properly closed, fuel oil gradually spilled out after the
ship became grounded. However the area and quantity of the
spillage were limited, indicating that the oil reservoirs remained undamaged. Table 3 lists the daily observation records.
1) Oil Spillage Evaluation
Oil spills at sea undergo a series of physical and chemical
processes, including evaporation, spread, dispersion, emulsification, dissolution, oxidation, sedimentation, biodegradation, …, etc. When oil spills onto the surface of the ocean, its
volume will rapidly reduce and then expand owing to the first
few processes as listed above. The research of the Oil Spill
Response Limited (OSRL, http://www.oilspillresponse.com
/services/index.html) in England found that for a volume of
100 m3 surface oil spill, 40% would evaporate and 10% would
spread and disperse, therefore 50 m3 would remain and emul-

sify into a mousse, increasing in mass by four times as a result,
to reach about 200 m3 and eventually to be removed by other
processes. Simply put, approximately 50% of spilled oil is lost
before emulsification. In fact, the quantity of oil lost may be
even larger owing to the agitation of wind and waves during
poor sea conditions.
Since the SAMHO BROTHER mishap on November 30th,
the HRC calculated the total quantity of recovered oil as
26.156 tons prior to incineration. Based on the physical and
chemical processes of oil spill, the quantity of oil prior to
emulsification should be 26.156 tons ÷ 4 = 6.54 tons. However, as listed in Table 2, the sea conditions in the Taiwan
Strait are extremely difficult during the northeast monsoon in
winter. In general, the oil lost at sea at early stage after spilling
could be subjectively estimated at approximately 80% rather
than 50%. The recovered oil thus may account for only 20%
of total spilled oil, and thus could be estimated as 6.54 tons ÷
20% = 32.7 tons. Since the total fuel oil carried on the vessel
was 81 tons, the sunken ship continued to carry approximately
45 to 50 tons. This amount of remaining oil may spill out in
future if the wreck moves significantly to cause further damages of oil reservoirs either under oceanic motions or further
human actions. The mousse, emulsified oil mixed with water,
would cause the viscosity of spilled oil to increase, and
therefore enhances the difficulty for cleaning up and consequently affects the ecosystem. The latent peril brought by the
remained oil thus must be under control.
2) Latent Peril Associated with Remaining Oil
After the SAMHO BROTHER accident, the HRC demanded
the ship owner contract specialized agencies to conduct oil
blockage and recovery. Until November 30th, 50 days after the
ship mishap, no more oil spillage was detected on the sea
surface. The disaster was thus considered to be under control,
and it was assumed that oil had stopped leaking from the
vessel. Information on air and sea conditions collected during
the oil spill monitoring period provided the opportunity to
examine and estimate the probability of further spillage occurring and thus assist in latent crisis control.
Based on the OSRL method for estimating oil spillage, oil
on the sea surface generally drifts at the same speed and in the
same direction as the prevailing ocean current. However,
since spilled oil is floating on the surface, such surface oil is
also affected by surface winds and dragged leewards at a speed
of about 3% of wind speed. In other words, the oil spill on the
sea surface will dissipate as a vector sum of ocean current and
wind at sea surface.
According to the database of the National Center for Ocean
Research (NCOR) in Taiwan (http://www.ncor.ntu.edu.tw/odbs/
index.html), the mean sea current at a depth of 20 m,
120°52’30”E, 24°52’30”N, is u = 12.4 cm/s and v = 20.0 cm/s
(Fig. 5). This velocity is equivalent to 23.5 cm/s for speed and
32° for direction (i.e., roughly towards the northeast). In addition, the statistic rose diagram (Fig. 6) of current measurements for nearby areas taken by RV/OR2 in October, 2005
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Table 2. Observation and disposition log on oil spill in SAMHO BROTHER mishap.
Stage

Date
Oct 11, 2005
16:30
Oct 15

One

Oct 17-22

Oct 20-22
Oct 23-24

Two

Location
24.58°N
120.48°E
25.01°N
120.50°E

24.57°N
120.47°E
24.58°N
120.47°E

Sea State

Oil Spill State

Conduct

Poor

Light, silvery oil slick, floating, 5 nm
around mishap site.

Small amount of oil recovery.

Poor

Silver oil film expanded
900 × 50 m oil slicks.

ORBs working on oil recovery.

Wave 6-9 m
Wind 7-9 B*
Gust 11 B

No observation conducted due to
typhoon.

Small amount of oil recovery.

Poor

No oil detected from the air.

Improved

Oct 27

25.01°N
120.50°E

Good

Oct 27-Nov 16

24.58°N
120.47°E

Improved

Nov 17-23

24.58°N
120.47°E

Nov 25 and after

24.58°N
120.47°E

Poor, strong
winds and
waves
Improved
slightly, still
poor

Found new oil slick
200 × 10 m silver white oil slicks.
06:45 air force F16 and 16:06 army
helicopter took two rounds of 4 missile
shootings. 12 vessels guarded and
monitored. Ship wreck did not sink
after shooting.
Oil slicks enlarged to be 7 km long and
50-100 m wide. Yellowish to dark
brown oil slicks spread northward from
south to the sea at Taoyuan. Nearest to
the coast is ~9 nm.

ORBs working on oil recovery.
RV/OR2 and CESH closely
monitored the site before and
after the shooting. Benzene
leakage was not found. Oil
recovery continues.

ORBs working on oil recovery.

Air observation. Oil slicks has been
scrambled and dispersed to disappear.

ORBs stopped working.

Oil was found from time to time near
the site.

Oil reduced. No oil recovery in
few days.

*B stands for Beaufort Scale.

N

Composite Current Velocity Vectors at 020 m
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23°N

22°N

22°N
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0

Fig. 5. Seasonal mean currents around Taiwan in autumn. (Information
source: National Center of Ocean Research). The red square indicates the location of the ship wreck.

0 < V < 30 cm/s

0

5

10

15

20%

30 ≤ V < 60 cm/s
60 ≤ V < 90 cm/s [mean V = 27 cm/s, 33°]
~2% 90 ≤ V < 130 cm/s
Fig. 6. The statistics in rose diagram for the one day currents observed
by the ADCP on RV/OR2 at the depth of 20 m around the ship
mishap in October, 2005.
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coastline of Taiwan. Besides the opposite effects of mean
current and wind drag, this phenomenon should also result
from reciprocating flood tides and ebb tides. It was mentioned
therein before that the resultant flow of mean and semi-diurnal
tidal currents on the western coast of Taiwan could be estimated as 25 cm/s. Therefore, for the same phase of about 6
hours, the oil spill could be extended by the reciprocating tidal
currents for about 5.4 km, not too different from the observed
elongation of 7 km, as shown in Table 2. This successful
approach proves the reliability of that the latent peril of further
dissipation of remained oil, such as whether the effluent will
be drifted far away or merely elongated at local place, can be
predicted by the air and sea conditions. Accordingly, this approach will also benefit the planning of contamination tracking, blocking, and recovering processes.

20
108
0
360
270
180
90
35
0
5
4
3
2
1
0
360
270
180
90
0
15

N
W
S
E

N

N
W
S
E
N

10
5
October ------>

0
0

10

November ------>

20

30

40

50

J-day since 2005/10/1
Fig. 7. Information of winds and waves observed by the weather buoy
located as shown in Fig. 1.

shows that the coastal current directions mainly lie from the
north to the east with a mean direction of 33° and a mean speed
of 27 cm/s. These two current assessments thus agree with
each other to a good extent. Accordingly, the leaked oil should
have been traveling at 10 nm per day towards the north
northeast.
On the other hand, the Central Weather Bureau of Taiwan
maintains a weather buoy at 24°46'43" N, 120°52'48" E, indicated by * in Fig. 1, a position 1.5 km from the coast with a
water depth of 22 m. The recorded wind field from October to
November is shown in Fig. 7. Table 2 shows that the oil spill
failed to display any recovery from October 11th to 15th.
During this five day period, Fig. 6 indicates that the strongest
wind speed during the northeast monsoon was about 10 m/s,
while the mean wind speed was 7~8 m/s and the direction was
35°. Therefore, the wind leeward effect upon oil floating on
the sea surface should have had a magnitude of 10 nm per day
to the south southwest. In other words, the vector sum of
current drift and wind drag should have become zero, meaning
that the area of oil contamination should have stopped growing. The area of oil spill condition in Table 2 indicates a
similar signal that the oil effluent did not leave the area of the
accident, demonstrating that the above estimate, based upon
air and sea conditions, is rational.
However, Table 2 also indicates that the oil spill had the
form of a strip roughly mirroring the orientation of the western

2. Detection of Benzene Leakage
Benzene is a highly volatile, flammable, toxic, and carcinogenic fluid. It releases toxic gases such as carbon monoxide during inflammation. Health hazards exist in the form
of pathological changes to the skin at benzene concentrations
exceeding 5 ppm in air, and the hazard becomes immediately
life threatening with an excess of 500 ppm. Hence, the ROC
EPA has regulated 5 ppm as the maximum allowable concentration of benzene in air, while in water the level is set at 10
ppm [7].
Following the mishap, the HRC immediately commissioned the Center for Environmental Safety and Health
Technology Development (CESH) to collect water and air
samples for benzene testing. CESH personnel began drawing
samples from the south side of the ship wreck (the leeward
side during the northeast monsoon) from Oct 11th to 14th, and
then conducted more comprehensive surveys on October 15th.
Afterwards, three observation stations located about 800 m
away from the accident site in different directions named north
Station #1, east Station #2, and south (leeward) Station #3.
Monitoring of sea air was conducted in advance using a
portable Photoionization Detector [14] on ORBs by detecting
the total volatile organic compound (TVOC). Abnormalities
were taken to indicate benzene leakage from the shipwreck,
and thus water samples of wherever were immediately gathered in stainless steel containers and sent to the lab for further
analysis using Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer (GC/MS)
[8]. Meanwhile, regardless of the results of real-time air monitoring, the benzene concentration of water was routinely measured using GC/MS at the three stations. Coastal monitoring
systems were established separately at three fishing ports,
Nanliao in Hsinchu, and Wypu and Tongshiao in Miaoli (Fig.
1). At these ports, a similar method was applied to measure
benzene concentration in sea water while the large equipment
of Open-path Fourier Transform Infrared (OP-FTIR) [18] was
set up to continuously monitor airborne benzene concentration.
Since the HRC decided to attempt to blow the vessel up on
October 27th, monitoring and testing tasks were suspended
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Table 3. The 1st stage in situ air concentrations of benzene before bombing SAMHO BROTHER.
Position

North Station #1

East Station #2

October 11
October 12
October 13
October 14

–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

October 15

–

October 16
October 17
October 18
October 19
October 20
October 21
October 22
October 23

–
–

Date

0.015~0.020 ppm
0.015~0.020 ppm
0.010~0.015 ppm
0.015 ppm
Mean in the morning 0.502 ppm, the highest 3.42 ppm (800 m)
–
Evening 0.015 ppm (360 m)
–
0.150~0.200 ppm (800 m)
–
0.060~0.120 ppm (360 m)
Wind waves too high to sail out.
Wind waves too high to sail out.
Wind waves too high to sail out.
–
–
0 ppm
0.001~0.005 ppm
0.003~0.008 ppm
0.001~0.005 ppm

–
0~0.009 ppm
0.003~0.008 ppm

120.77 120.78 120.79 120.80 120.81 120.82
24.99
N

Latitude (°N)

24.98

#1

24.98

2

1
N1

9

24.97

8 #2

10
24.96

14

11
4

24.95

3

12 #3

7
24.96

13

5
6

24.94

24.94

120.77 120.78 120.79 120.80

South Station #3
(leeward in NE monsoon)

120.81 120.82

Longitude (°E)
Fig. 8. The 3 stations (blue triangles) for water and air samplings during
Oct. 11 – Nov. 30 taken by CESH and the 14 stations by RV/OR2
before the explosion operation on October 26-27th in 2005. Water
samples were also taken along the red cruise line after the explosion.

temporarily. Therefore, the period from October 11th to 23rd
was considered the first stage in the benzene monitoring
(Table 2). Before and after the explosion, from Oct 26th to 29th,
the R/V OR2 was sent to the disaster area to conduct a close
investigation. Investigation revealed that the benzene aboard
the ship had failed to ignite, and the ship had sunk to the bottom of the ocean on October 30th. Since it was difficult to
confirm whether the benzene tanks had been damaged to cause
leakage, the R/V OR2 visited the accident site again on November 1st~2nd to make another survey. Subsequently, only
minimal and scattered in situ surveys were performed, given
constraints resulting from sea conditions and other factors.
Nonetheless, coastal monitoring continued until November

30th, and was known as the second stage in the benzene
monitoring (Table 2).
At the first stage from October 11th to 15th, the monitoring
results revealed that the maximum concentration of airborne
benzene was 0.128 ppm, while the waterborne concentration
was extremely low, at just 0.021 mg/L. Thus, while there
appeared to have been some benzene leakage, the recorded
environmental levels were well within the 5 ppm set by the
EPA. Notwithstanding, none of the other factors examined
exhibited an alarming concentration either. As for the airborne
concentration of benzene at the site as listed in Table 3, the
peak concentration was the 0.20 ppm detected on October 16,
which was also well below the EPA allowed airborne concentration.
At the second stage, a few days following the missile operation from Oct 27th to November 2nd, a small quantity of
benzene continued to be detected in the water near the sunken
vessel. The highest concentration was 0.003 mg/L, consistent
with small-scale benzene leakage, but the concentration was
reduced greatly from the amount detected at the first stage.
After a month of monitoring, benzene was not detected in the
water any more. As for airborne benzene concentration, the
highest level was 0.004 pm, considerably lower than the 5 ppm
set by the EPA. Benzene was not detected in the air or water in
the nearby coastal region, and no damage to life was sustained
along the coast.
The close monitoring and testing right after and before the
missile attack included works implemented by CESH and the
R/V OR2’s intensive surveys of airborne and waterborne
benzene contamination in the area surrounding the site of
the accident. From 17:00 to 24:00 on October 26th, R/V OR2
collected water samples at depths of 0 m, 25 m, and 70 m at 14
stations (Fig. 8) in a 0.5 nm radius of the ship wreck. Among
various testing items, benzene detection was again performed
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#1 0.0030 mg/L
#2 0.0030 mg/L
N
200 m
Ship
mishap
site

#3 < 0.0002 mg/L
#4 0.0002 mg/L
#5 < 0.0002 mg/L
#6 < 0.0002 mg/L
#7 < 0.0002 mg/L
#8 < 0.0002 mg/L
#9 < 0.0002 mg/L

Fig. 9. The results and locations for detecting air concentration of benzene performed by CESH on Oct. 27th, 2005 after the explosion of
the ship wreck.

using the GC/MS method. The detection threshold was
0.0002 mg/L, and the results were all ND (none detectable).
At dawn on October 27th, the missile attack started. At 10:20,
the R/V OR2 entered the area of about 0.2 nm radius of the site
(the red cruise track in Fig. 8) to collect eight water samples,
and once again failed to detect any benzene. Additionally,
CESH also entered the same area at 07:40 and tested for airborne benzene. Figure 9 shows the testing stations and results.
The results were mostly ND with the exceptions of Stations 1,
2, and 4 which were far below the standard set by the EPA
again.

IV. COUNTERMEASURES
After the SAMHO BROTHER was attacked by missiles, the
benzene and fuel oil were not ignited, the latent danger remained unresolved, and thus a final clean up operation is still
needed. In the past, there were numerous instances of ships
sunk, but salvaging or exploding sunken ships was only rarely
considered due to technological difficulty, mainly being confined to situations where the wreck was considered a hazard to
other shipping, where the wreck contained valuables, or where
there was an environmental risk. Recently, the underwater
technology advances greatly, and thus searching and salvaging
of sunken ship is becoming increasingly common.
Based on previous estimates, approximately an amount of
50 tons fuel oil remains inside the wreck. This figure corresponds with the 55 tons estimate remained in the oil reservoir
near the starboard side, the number given by specialists of the
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
the organization commissioned by the insurance company of
the ship owner. If all of the fuel leaks out during subsequent
operations, the catastrophic extent is still considered limited
and controlled. Restated, the area and intensity of spillage
associated pollution can be estimated and calculated if the air
and sea conditions such as ocean currents, winds, and tides are
available. In addition, adequate information on the water qual-

ity and environmental ecosystem of the site must be collected
to serve as a basis for making follow up comparisons in identifying responsibility of the accident. Therefore, any selected
scheme would depend for its success on the availability of
such related information.
Benzene is the most problematic aspect of this accident,
with the vessel carrying a significant quantity. The accident
was unprecedented locally and internationally in history, and
thus no duplicate experience or information was available.
The Japanese benzene ship M/T Kyokuyo-Maru exploded
after catching fire as a result of the initial collision in July,
2005 and thus fuel oil and benzene carried on board were
entirely burned out before the ship was towed out to sea and
sunk. The situation still differed from SAMHO BROTHER,
which sank with its nine benzene tanks completely intact.
In the history of maritime disasters, the most difficult and
dangerous case was undoubtedly the salvaging of the Kursk,
the Russian nuclear submarine. The submarine sank on Aug.
12th, 2000, and its salvage attracted global attention. In order
to quickly eliminate the risk associated with leakage of radioactive materials, the Kursk Foundation was established
three months after the disaster to raise funds, plan, and monitor
the salvage operation. An alliance was established among
international salvage companies, and before the operation, the
Russian Academy of Sciences carried out large scale simulation and integrated testing to determine when was the appropriate time for salvaging and transporting the submarine with
twenty-two Granit cruise missiles carried on board. In addition, computer simulations were performed to test the procedures and techniques used for deep water salvage, and deep
water divers drilled using a similar nuclear submarine for the
dangerous and complicated salvage procedures. The entire
operation cost 80 million USD.
To the mishap, subsequent handling of the SAMHO BROTHER
and its hazardous cargo must comply with ROC’s law, which
regulates that ship owners need to assume full responsibility
for releasing the environmental impact. Meanwhile, the
relevant authorities, such as the EPA and the Ministry of
Transportation & Communications should be in charge of
supervising and implementing tasks like comprehensive security protection and emergency rescue in any further operation of the ship wreck. After the accident, two possible responses were initially proposed, namely to raise and tow the
ship away or to blow it up with explosives on site.
Nevertheless, the sea conditions were poor when plans
were made for the vessel to be towed, while there was considerable uncertainty attached to an alternative proposal to
delay salvage operations until the summer. A delay in dealing
with the problem would also have placed the ROC government under pressure from concerned citizens. Therefore after
discussion, on-site bombing from the air was determined to be
the acceptable approach in considering people’s life safety in
cleaning operation. However, the results were not as anticipated. The ship wreck sank to the bottom of the sea with no
explosion. At that time, the ship owner and ROC government
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officials conferred and agreed to take further actions during
the summer of the following year when the sea condition
steadied. Yet, at the time of writing, there was no promised
action having taken place, possibly because the two parties
failed to reach a consensus on a practical implementation.
Based on the international experience of dealing with sunken
vessels carrying dangerous substances, as well as the Taiwan’s
oceanic condition, four possible responses for dealing with the
aftermath of the disaster are described below.
1. No Further Action
In this scenario no further action would be taken to treat the
sunken ship. That is, the accident would be treated as a regular
maritime disaster, and the forces of nature would be allowed to
run their course in dealing with the ship and its cargo. Maybe
it is the cheapest way to do in the short term, and given that the
ship is lying at a depth of 70 m, it represents a hazard for
shipping immediately. Nonetheless, the potential for a disaster
for local fisheries remains. After several years, when the ship
has corroded, the fuel oil within the vessel may spill out.
Therefore, long term monitoring of the local oceanic environment should be implemented for possible oil pollution.
On the other hand for benzene onboard, the nine storage
tanks would have been tightly sealed before the accident, and
the ship is just four years old at present (Table 1). It means that
the tanks should remain safe for about ten more years in sea
water. Nevertheless, any event of a major leak, although only
approximately 0.07% of the benzene dissolved in water, would
lead to the continuing possibility of toxic sea water affecting
nearby marine life and ecosystems. In such a case, most of the
benzene would rise to the sea surface and dissipate to the air,
with the course of the wind, being blown towards the coast to
endanger the health of coastal habitants. The influence of such
a spill is difficult to forecast owing to the lack of relevant
knowledge, controversies between the ship owner and the
ROC government might therefore arise.
As a consequence of uncertainties, the authorities must
establish a long-term team of specialists to monitor the potential for environmental disaster. The total costs must come
from the insurance company of the ship owner, and a guarantee fund to ensure adequate handling of long-term environmental influence should be deposited in bank as a credit. Even
though, the remains of the ship will become a nightmare for
the coastal environment, and therefore, taking no further actions is not the optimal response.
2. Salvage the Ship and Its Cargo
Since benzene is flammable, there is a constant risk of explosion, making any salvage operation involving the SAMHO
BROTHER highly dangerous. According to the case of Kursk,
comprehensive testing and preparation therefore should be
performed before implementing any salvage operation. Such
operation should be scheduled in either the summer or the fall,
when air and sea conditions are good. Although the mean
seasonal current in the Taiwan Strait is not strong (Fig. 5), the
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reciprocating coastal tidal currents are not weak. As shown
in Fig. 6, flood and ebb tidal currents may reach speeds exceeding one knot, creating a challenge for divers. Generally,
the seabed comprises soft sand. Under strong and variable
tidal current flushing, lateral drift causes the vessel to sink
easily below sands due to the weight of the ship wreck. Divers
or ROV (remotely operated vehicle) may need to drill holes in
the hull of the ship at a significant depth beneath the sands to
secure cables for lifting, potentially an extremely hazardous
procedure.
Before the operation, an international salvage supervision
team must be established to perform the following tasks. (a)
Investigate and gather information and data on oceanic and
coastal environments within a 20 km radius of the sunken ship
before commencing the salvaging operation. (b) Solicit the
most qualified salvage company in the world to execute the
operation. (c) Conduct simulation and testing of the chosen
proposal. (d) Superintend the in situ salvage operation. (e)
Supervise synchronized surveys on the marine environment
during the salvage operation. (f) Demand environmental investtigation of the nearby oceanic and coastal regions for at least
one year after the salvage operation.
In view of such a scenario, salvaging the ship along with the
cargo should be able to completely eliminate the benzene
hazard and thus all contingent environmental problems. Such
salvage operation would be the best way to keep the coastal
region away from further catastrophe. The only setback lies in
the complexity of the operation, as well as the risk of explosion and costly failure. The compensation could be from either
the value of the benzene in the nine tanks or the ship itself
which is still quite new for repaired or sold as scraps. Nonetheless, the value of the recovered chemicals and of the vessel
itself will hardly offset the costs of the operation. Therefore,
the owner may be unwilling to fund such operation, possibly
leading to legal action between the ROC government and the
insurance company of the ship owner.
3. Extract Fuel Oil and Benzene
If the oil and benzene can somehow be removed from the
vessel, the ship will no longer present a potential hazard to the
local marine ecosystem, making salvage unnecessary. The
ship wreck could even become a benefit to the surrounding
ecosystem in the form of an artificial fishing reef. The operation cost may thus become much lower than that of the second
scenario discussed above. In fact, the water depth of 70 m
always causes technical difficulties for divers. Compared to
the second scenario, lifting the ship wreck will no longer be
necessary making the extracting operation much easier.
However, the need to directly contact the benzene tanks added
another risk factor to such operation.
The implementation of this countermeasure requires the
same careful preparation, evaluation, and supervision as the
second scenario. However, extensive supervision is also required for precise measurement of the quantity of oil and
benzene extracted. If the measurement reveals that the fuel oil
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and benzene have not been completely extracted, possible
environmental problems resulting from leakage of the remaining in the ship wreck still exist. If such a case happened,
the ship wreck would still need to be salvaged and lifted, at
considerable difficulty and expense again. The ROC authorities in charge of this matter thus may ask the owner to perform
extraction first, and then evaluate the results before taking
further action to salvage the wreck.
In other words, failure to succeed in this operation may
mean that the second scheme then has to be performed anyway.
However, this method at least gives the ship owner an opportunity of following this scheme only, if a complete extraction
of oil and benzene is proved. Therefore, the key is the method
used to extract the substances, and then to assess the results.
Any disagreement between the ship owner and ROC government with the assessments of oil and benzene extractions
would result in another endless legal controversy.
4. Complete Underwater Explosion
The initial response to the accident was to blow up the ship
using missiles. This idea was chosen because it was hoped
that blowing up the ship would ignite the highly flammable
benzene the ship was carrying, thus reducing the pollution to a
minimal extent. On the whole, burning would quickly resolve
the danger of the chemical ship, therefore, it should still be
considered as an acceptable approach aside from abandoning
the shipwreck. However, the attempt to ignite the dangerous
cargo in the sinking ship further complicates the situation.
Now the ship can only be effectively blown up by either
using explosives placed by divers or a torpedo shot from a
distance. At the depth of 70 m, the former involves advanced
techniques and the uncertainty of explosion danger, while the
latter requires a sound source on the sunken ship which can be
installed by a ROV or divers. However, the latter may cause
another miss shot and greatly increase the risk of further
operations. Therefore using a torpedo is less desirable than
placing explosives using human divers owing to the lower
precision.
In addition, underwater explosion involves another uncertainty, namely how the benzene will react when the tanks are
exploded. Will it explode and burn out instantaneously to
become harmless or upwell to surface and evaporate into the
air? In case of any amount of benzene floating to the surface of
the water, some techniques must be applied to burn it off from
the surface. For example, fire sources must be set up on the
surface of the water when the underwater explosion occurs so
that once benzene upwells to the surface, it will be burn out
immediately. The main concern is that such procedure has
never been adopted. Therefore, nobody can forecast the results with any certainty. A simulated testing with small experimental amount of benzene released at bottom to be performed at sea in advance is thus suggested.
Conducting underwater explosive work requires a specialized execution team. The focus should be placed on the explosion procedure and simulation testing. However, the large

quantity benzene stored in the tanks surges upwards to the
surface all at once when the explosion occurs. Although the
amount to be dissolved in water is thought to be limited, the
area affected and the duration of the effect still cannot be well
determined with current knowledge of science. Hence it is
suggested that at least three years of follow up tracking on the
air and sea environments of the ship mishap should be conducted. Overall, from the perspective of technical difficulty,
the feasibility of this approach is highest among the proposals
presented here while the risk is lowest. The entire process
should be the simplest.
To summarize the four scenarios in reversed sequence: (1)
Underwater explosion appears to be the most feasible option
in terms of technical requirements and effectiveness, as well as
being the quickest solution to implement. That is the reason
for HRC to recommend the explosive approach to the ship
owner initially. However, it was implemented, under the time
constraints, and without careful design and study, rendering
the results disappointed. (2) The technical difficulty of extracting the remaining oil and benzene at the depth of 70 m
underwater can be overcome, but the measurement of extracted substances is critical. If the remains cannot be completely extracted, alternative method must be implemented.
Therefore, extraction of benzene relies strongly on chance. (3)
Although salvaging the ship and the cargo on board would be a
straightforward method, it is complicated and costly, as well as
being risky, and thus being unappealing to the ship owner. (4)
Not taking further action to treat the ship wreck at all, the ship
owner must face the long-term consequences of all kinds of
risks, and the ROC government will also have to be liable for
the chronic environmental pollution of Taiwan’s coastal region,
and therefore this approach is not recommended.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Marine accidents cannot be completely avoided, and oil
spill hazards exist in association with such events. In the case
of marine accidents involving chemical ships, the risk is considerably magnified. Oil spill occurred immediately in the
case of the SAMHO BROTHER, a chemical ship laden with
benzene sank in the Taiwan Strait on October 10th, 2005. Oil
effluent of 35 tons was recovered. Careful estimation then
determined that 50 tons of fuel oil remained in the vessel.
Simultaneously, the result of the environmental monitoring
indicated only limited benzene leakage occurred. Some 3,140
m3 of benzene were still stored in the nine tanks. The Taiwan
Strait suffered heavy seas during the northeast monsoon. Such
conditions made an immediate conventional clean up impossible, and therefore it was decided to blow up the ship with
missiles to burn off as much of the benzene as possible.
However, the plan failed to achieve the anticipated result. The
ship and its cargo sank to the bottom of the sea at the depth of
70 m and the benzene failed to ignite. Therefore, further action needs to be taken to deal with the dilemma.
There are four possibilities for dealing with the sunken ship,
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including leaving the ship at its current site, salvaging the ship
and its cargo, and extracting the remaining fuel oil and benzene, and/then blowing up the ship in an underwater explosion.
To solely rely on the power of nature to dispose of the ship will
result in substantial environmental damage, and therefore is
unacceptable to the public. This will also create a long-term
burden for the ship owners and insurance companies, and thus
is an infeasible approach. Next, salvaging the ship and its
cargo would be a rather straightforward approach, but this
approach would be costly and technically difficult, so the ship
owner and the insurance company may be unwilling to agree
for full responsibility. The ROC’s authorities attempting to
request the ship owner to follow this course may result in
legal delays and ultimately the losing of the two parties. The
next best option is to conduct underwater extraction of the
remaining oil and benzene and leave the shipwreck permanently at the bottom of the sea. The key to success of this
proposal is the completeness of the extraction. If the extracted
amount fails to match the total amount, then supplemental
procedures must be implemented. Therefore, this scheme can
only serve as the preparation procedure for the alternative
approaches, except when the measurement of the extracted oil
equals to or exceeds the estimate of the oil remained. The final
scheme is to conduct an underwater explosion. This approach
is technically feasible, quick, effective, and possibly least
costly. The possibility of reaching a consensus between the
ROC officials and the ship owner should be high, and therefore, this scheme deserves consideration.
When dealing with disputes arising from international marine accidents, government agencies all over the world need to
be determined to achieve the best outcomes for all concerned
despite conflicting pressures of political situation, criticism,
and public opinion, … etc. The parties involved in such disputes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, are typically
attended to by insurance companies, and the emphasis should
be placed on acceptable compensation rather than lawsuits.
Consensus must be reached. The case of benzene described
here was unprecedented internationally. Various considerations and experiences are valuable for international scholars in
various fields, including ocean science, oceanic ecology, and
underwater technologies. For example, air and sea conditions,
such as coastal currents, waves, tides, and winds need to be
monitored and observed over the long-term, so the data collected can provide a basis for analyzing further actions, and
can be used in disaster control.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks would give to those who participated in the
entire rescue mission and to the reviewers of this paper for
their comments and kind helps. Mr. Ted Knoy is also appreciated for his editorial assistance.

163

REFERENCES
1. Alvarez-Salgado, X. A., Herrera, J. L., Gago, J., Otero, P., Soriano, J. A.,
Pola, C. G., and Garcia-Soto, C., “Influence of the oceanographic conditions during spring 2003 on the transport of the Prestige tanker fuel oil
to the Galician coast,” Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 53, pp. 239-249
(2006).
2. Amundsen, I., Iosjpe, M., Reistad, O., Lind, B., Gussgaard, K., Strand, P.,
Borghuis, S., Sickel, M., and Dowdall, M., “The accidental sinking of the
nuclear submarine, the Kursk: monitoring of radioactivity and the preliminary assessment of the potential impact of radioactive releases,”
Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 44, pp. 459-468 (2002).
3. Bethune, B., “The Kursk tragedy,” Maclean’s, Vol. 116, pp. 62 (2003).
4. Carracedo, P., Torres-Lopez, S., Barreiro, M., Montero, P., Balseiro, C. F.,
Penabad, E., Leitao, P. C., and Perez-Munuzuri, V., “Improvement of
pollutant drift forecast system applied to the Prestige oil spills in Galicia
Coast (NW of Spain): Development of an operational system,” Marine
Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 53, pp. 350-360 (2006).
5. Chen, H. Y. and Lee, Y. L., “An ecological survey on the waters adjacent
to the Northern Taiwan nuclear power plant sites,” National Scientific
Committee on Problems of the Environment Academia Sinica, Special
Issue, pp. 74 (In Chinese) (2006).
6. Chiau, W. Y., “Changes in the marine pollution management system in
response to the Amorgos oil spill in Taiwan,” Marine Pollution Bulletin.
Vol. 51, pp. 1041-1047 (2006).
7. EPA, 2004. “Marine pollution control by Environmental Protection Administration,” http://cemnt.epa.gov.tw/eng/.
8. GC/MS, “Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectroscopy Background,”
http://www.gmu.edu/deparments/SRIF/tutorial/gcd/gc-ms2.htm.
9. Gilfillan, E. S., Harner, E. J., O’Reilly, J. E., Page, D. S., and Burns,
W. A., “A comparison of shoreline assessment study designs used for the
Exxon Valdez,” Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 38, Issue 5, pp. 380-388
(1999).
10. Lin, C. L. and Hu, J. H., “SAMHO BROTHER benzene ship accident,”
Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 54, pp. 1285-1286 (2007).
11. Louis, A., “Kursk down,” Military Law Review, Vol. 176, pp. 459-466
(2003).
12. Mitja Gregorič, “Two tankers collided-chemical tanker carrying 1,000
tonnes of creosote,” http://ctif-hazmat.gasilci.org/modules/news/article.
php?storyid=87 (2005).
13. Petit, C. W., “Raising the Kursk,” U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 131,
No. 5, pp. 40 (2001).
14. PID, Introduction Photoionization Detector, http://www.shsu.edu/~
chemistry/PID/PID.html.
15. Shao, K. C., “The comments of ship mishap oil contamination disposal
incident,” National Policy Research Foundtion, http://old.npforg.tw/
PUBLICATION/SD/090/SD-R-090-004.htm (In Chinese) (2001).
16. Shigenaka, G., Hayes, M. O., Michel, J., Henry, C. B. Jr., Robert, P.,
Houghton, J. P., and Lees, D. C., “Integrating physical and biological
studies of recovery from the Exxon Valdez oil spill-case studies of four
sites in prince william sound,” 1989-1994 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division, pp. 238 (1997).
17. Stekoll, M. S. and Deysher, L., “Response of the dominant alga fucus
gardneri (Silva) (Phaeophyceae) to the Exxon Valdez oil spill and cleanup,” Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 40, pp. 1028-1041 (2000).
18. Yang, J. C. and Chang, P. O., “Fourier transform infrared, FTIR,” Center
for Environmental Safety & Health Technology Development, Industrial
Technology Research Institute. (In Chinese) (2002).

